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LEGAL CONVERGENCE OF EAST AND WEST
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN WATER LAW
. By
ROBERT HASKELL ABRAMS*
Before setting out on this Article, I would like to take this opportunity to
express my sense of privilege in being able to write in the company of so many
scholars and friends in tribute to the many contributions of Janet Neuman and
James Huffman to the fields of water law and property rights more generally. I
always have benefitted when reading their works.
Legal instrumentasm and legal convergence, two legal constructs,
describe how American water law has developed over time. A study of
early Eastern and Western water law shows that both systems are
instrumentalist at their core and evolved to suit pressing developmental
needs. Early on in the East, law was created to protect water use for
millers, who used mills to generate power. In the West, rivarian
systems of the East were rejected in favor of a system that met the
needs of settlers in more arid environments. Legal convergence is a
concept suggesting that law governing various fields converges over
time-the legal solution best adapted to solving a problem becomes the
dominant approach. Legal convergence, like instrumentalism, supports
the notion that in matters of societal importance, such as allocation of
water resources, the law will converge around the most effective
solutions This Article explores a number of more contemporary
converging, parallel developments in Eastern and Western water law
where both regimes have come together despite their fundamental,
underlying differences in water rights formulation. These include
integration of surface water and groundwater and obtaining full
utilization of the resource, elimination of situs of use restrictions, and
protection ofinstream and other communitarian values-each example
demonstrates that both regions are adopting similar responses to reach
a common goal to utilize water resources to meet as many water needs
as possible. This Article predicts that the next major change in Eastern
and Western water law will be a convergent approach to water triage
during episodes ofregional water shorige.
* Professor of Law, Florida A & M University, College of Law. The author would like to
thank the Florida A & M University College of Law for its research support, and Ms. Akunna
Olumba, a J.D. candidate, for her research assistance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider two constructs-legal instrumentalism and legal
convergence-and their possible application to American water law. In a
variety of ways I have long expressed the view that water law develops in an
instrumentalist manner that permits society to make the most important
contemporary uses of water resources.' As an initial form of convergence, a
brief recollection of the formative stages of Eastern and Western water law
shows them both to be instrumentalist to the core-rejecting law that did
not suit the needs of the then-pressing situation in favor of water law that
supported developmental needs.
In the East, for example, when a vitally important need was the
repeated use of water for generating power for milling in the early
nineteenth century, the water law was crafted, legislatively and judicially, to
permit seriatim use of the water by many mills as the water flows from its
headwaters to the sea.2 The so-called Mills Acte "solved" the problem of
erjoinable trespass of adjacent parcels inundated by mill ponds by granting
the equivalent of private condemnation to the millers. Similarly, case law
allowed new entrant millers to reasonably alter the flow regime, actions that
would have been erjoinable by adversely affected existing millers under
either English natural flow riparianism or a rule based on prior occupancy.
Physically, this occurred when the upper, later-in-time miller interdicted the
flow completely to fill their mill pond, preventing downstream users from
1 See, e.g, JOSEPH L. SAx, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 39-47 (4th ed. 2006); Robert H. Abrams, Charting the
Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381, 1385-86
(1989). See generally ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
(1982) (examining the theory of "pragmatic instrumentalism," which views legal rules and the
law in general as a series of tools created to serve practical ends and achieve societal goals).
2 See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1392-94.
3 See, e.g, Act of Feb. 27, 1796 (Mills Act), 1795 Mass. Acts 443, available at
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1795/1795acts0074.pdf.
4 Id. § 1, 1795 Mass. Acts at 443.
5 See Abrams, supns note 1, at 1395-96 (describing Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786 (Conn. 1888),
as a "Solomonic" decision that embraced reasonable use riparianism, which marked a departure
from the "ill-fitting" doctrines of natural flow riparianism and the rules of priority).
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having enough water to drive their mill.' In the nineteenth century West, if
the most important use of water was to support irrigation of the early
settlers of the West, where rainfall is scarce and streams are few and far
apart, the potentially "inherited" riparianism of the East had to be rejected in
favor of a system that met the needs of those settlers. It took the Territorial
Colorado Supreme Court in 1872 only a single phrase in prefacing its
decision in Yunker v. Nichols,7 to announce things necessarily were going to
be different when it penned the words, "[iun a dry and thirsty land."8 The
necessity of supporting societally vital use of water away from riparian
locations trumped even the most traditional private property rights of
neighboring landowners. Functioning similarly to the mill acts in the East,
Yunker recognized the need to have private rights of way to transport water
to its place of use in the West by subjecting intervening landowners between
the stream and situs of use to servitudes in favor of those using the water
resource." In almost all western states the same imperative led to the
eventual rejection of riparianism in favor of prior appropriation.10 The first
and most eloquent statement of that radical departure from riparianism was
judicially announced in 1882 in the landmark case of Coffin v Left Rand
Ditch Co." Thus, instrumentalism has been alive and well in all branches of
American water law for centuries.
The concept of legal convergence suggests that the law governing
various legal fields tends to converge over time." Sovereign jurisdictions are
not legally compelled to follow each other's lead, but over time, they tend to
do so." Without pretending to be a trained comparativist, I would describe
one of the principal theories supporting convergence as a sort of legal
Darwinism. The legal solution that is best adapted to solving the problem
eventually becomes the dominant approach that out-competes less robust
legal solutions."
Even a moment's reflection on those two constructs-instrumentalism
and a Darwinist-leaning theory of legal convergence-reveals their
underlying common ground. Both exhibit a confidence that in matters of
6 See, e.g, Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184, 185 (Vt. 1827); Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786, 788, 790
(Conn. 1888). An ancillary problem in Mason v. Hoyle was the fact that when the water was
released by the upstream miller, it was done so in larger than usual amounts that overflowed
the capacity of lower mill seats.
7 1 Colo. 551 (1872).
8 Id. at 553, 555 (granting private condemnation of rights of way to bring water to
nonriparian parcels).
9 See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1394-95, 1400 n.63.
10 See id. at 1389-90 (describing the western states' shift from riparianism to prior
appropriation as "the most dramatic example of 'fixing' 'broken' water law").
11 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).
12 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law,
32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 72 (1996) (defining convergence as "the tendency of legal systems, or
parts of legal systems, to evolve in parallel directions").
13 See id; William Blumenthal, The Challenge of Sovereignty and the Mechanisms of
Convergence, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 267, 273 (2004) (discussing the inherent voluntariness of
convergence of international laws regarding the merger review process in corporate law).
14 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 72-74 (describing unplanned, evolutionary norms).
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societal importance, such as the allocation of scarce water resources, the
law will gravitate toward and converge on the most effective legal doctrines
and solutions.'5 On the surface, of course,, claiming an instrumentalist
convergence of East and West in American water law is outlandish. The two
regions could scarcely have water law that is founded on more divergent
organizing principles. The entire water economy of the West is cantilevered
precariously on the water rights created on the basis of priority of use."
Much of the East still adheres to the vaguely defined water sharing required
by common law reasonable use riparianism. Since the outcome in any
particular case of user conflict is so fact-intensive and hard to predict," as
the competition for water increases, a number of states are adopting
administrative permit systems, usually called "regulated riparianism,"a' that
award users durationally limited permits to use specified quantities of water
for the expressly permitted uses.'9 In specifying quantities, type of use, and
place of use, regulated riparianism borrows some of the hallmarks of water
rights created under prior appropriation. Regulated riparianism remains true
to its roots, however, by maintaining the vernacular and conceptual
underpinnings of reasonable use that is associated with riparianism; uses
must be "reasonable" to serve as the basis for obtaining a permit, and what is
reasonable takes into account the state of the water source and the demands
of others for its use.'o At its core, however, regulated riparianism separates
itself from prior appropriation because the usufructuary rights it creates are
for a limited time, so that when permits expire new entrants are in a position
to seek allocation of the scarce water resource on the basis of a single set of
standards. Like the reasonable use riparianism from which it emerged,
regulated riparianism assesses permit applications with reference to current
conditions on the watercourse, permitting reallocation of the water on a
rolling basis."
Despite their ingrained historic and systemic differences, there are
several ways in which both East and West can be seen to be facing similar
problems and have adopted similar legal responses that accomplish the
15 See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image ofAuthority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349,
361 (1984) (explaining that instrumentalism means that a society adopts those legal rules that
efficiently promote a particular goal); Dimitry Kochenov, On Options of Citizens and Moral
Choices of States: Gays and European Federalsm, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 156, 169-70 (2009)
(advocating legal convergence to address the "most important issues, particularly related to
human rights").
16 See A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 983,
996-98 (2008).
17 See, e.g., Tunison v. Harper, 690 S.E.2d 819, 820-21 (Ga. 2010) (discussing expanded
irrigation use in competition with maintenance of pond's water level for fish habitat and
aesthetic enjoyment).
18 WATER LAWS COMM., AM. Soc'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER
CODE iv-v (Joseph W. Dellapenna ed., 1997). When published, the Model Code listed 17 riparian
jurisdictions as having adopted regulated riparianism. Id. at viii.
19 See id. at 272-73.
20 Id at 236-41.
21 See, e.g, A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:97 (2011).
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same result in the two different legal paradigms. The nineteenth century
examples, cited earlier, are a good example of parallel legal developments
(granting water users a de facto power of private condemnation) in the two
systems, solving similar problems (third party property rights) that
otherwise would thwart critical water-based development. This Article seeks
to explore a small number of more contemporary converging or at least
parallel developments of the water law in the East and West.
The convergence is not total and there is virtually no likelihood that the
West will ever abandon prior appropriation or that the East will adopt a
system in which priority is -determinative. Nevertheless, this Article will
survey three major areas where important parallel adaptations have been
accomplished or are underway. These are:
* Integration of surface water and groundwater and obtaining full utilization;
* Elimination of situs of use restrictions; and
* Protection of instream and other communitarian values.
Each of the developments is chosen to exemplify a slightly different
dynamic: the first where both doctrines had to adapt to hydrologic reality,
the second and third, where riparianism and then prior appropriation
effectively repudiated a fundamental principle of their system and adopted
the position that had long been a tenet of the other system.
In discussing the responses of East and West in each of these areas, it is
necessary to keep in mind that water law is primarily state law, so that it is
likely that the course followed by one state in a region will vary at least
slightly from the course taken by other states in the region. Similarly, it is
actually the case that not all states in either region have resolved the
problems presented in the areas being reviewed. Rather than cataloging each
state's approach, what I will do is treat the "law" of the East as being
embodied in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Regulated
Riparian Model Water Code, since that is the model to which I think the
states of the East will gravitate.2 2 In the West, I will give examples of.
adaptations in different states that I think exemplify the ability of prior
appropriation systems, within their doctrinal contexts, to address the
problem areas in the same way as does the East.
II. INTEGRATING LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS TO USE SURFACE WATER AND
GROUNDWATER AND TWO INSTRUMENTALIST SOLUTIONS TO THE LINKED PROBLEM
OF FULL UTILIZATION
In 1843, the renowned English case of Acton v Blundell3 included the
famous passage explaining that the movement of groundwater was
unknowable and, therefore, there could be no legal consequence associated
with use of groundwater.24 That decision effectively severed the law of
22 WATER LAWS COMM., supra note 18, at iv-v.
23 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
24 Id at 1233.
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surface water from the law of groundwater for almost 100 years, despite the
implausibility of the "unknowability" premise, even at the time it was
penned." As in England, the independence of surface water law and
groundwater law persisted in most American jurisdictions until the late
twentieth century despite the certainty provided by the science of
hydrogeology several decades earlier that surface water and groundwater
were intimately linked." The degree of interaction was (and still is)
expensive to ascertain," but it is knowable with sufficient precision to model
likely interactions at an expense that seldom will be beyond the reach of
most large volume water users.28
Despite the certain knowledge that surface water and groundwater
often were interconnected, water law played ostrich, putting its head in the
sand and failing to account for the linkage. In both East and West, user
conflicts arose in which competing usufructuary entitlements were claimed
under surface water law and groundwater law." A thorough mid-twentieth
century study of case law by Professor Davis made it plain that neither
region's law had a consistent answer to the problem created by having two
independent bodies of law, one for surface waters and one for groundwater,
creating simultaneous entitlements to the same hydrologically linked water."
As late as 1973, the National Water Commission was still describing the lack
of integration of groundwater and surface water entitlements as one of the
nation's three most critical groundwater issues. In the East, common law
usufructuary entitlements to water have never been quantified with
precision.32 Importantly, the states (both East and West) all claim to own the
water and grant only rights of use (usufructs), not rights to the corpus of the
water in place.3 Under surface water riparianism, when asked the extent of
25 See R. Timothy Weston, Hannonizing Management of Ground and Surface Water Use
Under Eastern WaterLaw Regimes, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 239, 245-46 (2008). The details or
precise mechanism may have been unknown or incompletely understood in 1843, but the cause
and effect relationship was patently obvious, as when opening a well on one parcel caused the
nearly simultaneous failure of a neighboring well or loss of flow in a stream. See Acton, 153
Eng. Rep. at 1232-33 (finding that pits dug near a stream had reduced the water level of
that stream).
26 See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Developing a Suitable Water Allocation Law for
Pennsylvania, 17 VIL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 59-61 (2006).
27 See SAX, THOMPSON, LESHY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 407-11.
28 Peter N. Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REV. 189, 234-35 (1972);
see also Herman Bouwer & Thomas Maddock, 111, Making Sense of the Interactions Between
Groundwater and Streamilow: Lessons for Water Masters and Adjudicators, 6 RIVERS 19, 19-30
(1997) (describing the interactions between surface and groundwater and techniques to analyze
such interactions).
29 See, e.g, Collens v. New Caanan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 828, 830-31 (Conn. 1967);
Collier v. Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., 722 P.2d 363, 364-66 (Ariz. App. 1986).
30 Davis, supra note 28, at 205, 209, 233-34.
31 NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 232-33 (1973).
32 See TARLOCK, supra note 21, § 3:69.
33 Seeid. §§ 4:6, 5:18. This source discusses some "semi-exceptions" to the nonownership of
corpus. The first is the rule of capture groundwater regimes, once reduced to possession (i.e.,
once pumped and controlled) that corpus does belong to the pumper, but water still in the
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a riparian's right to use water, the answer would be something like this: A
right to make a reasonable use of the water taking into consideration the
reasonable correlative rights of co-riparians to use the same waterbody.3
Under the two prevailing Eastern groundwater doctrines, the view that
follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts mimics the surface water law,
and the other, the American Reasonable Use Rule, allows unlimited use on
the overlying tract for a legitimate purpose.n
The Regulated Riparianism Model Water Code36 solves the problem of
integrating groundwater and surface water forthrightly:
In order to promote efficiency, equity, order, conjunctive management, and
stability in the utilization of the water resources of this State over time, this
Code and all orders, permit terms or conditions, or regulations issued pursuant
to this Code, are to be interpreted to achieve the policies embodied in this
Code and to conform to the physical laws' which govern the natural
occurrence, movement, and storage of water
The Commentary on that section also explains that one purpose of the
chosen language is to ensure that water management is directed toward
"ensuring conjunctive management of surface and underground waters."'
Conjunctive management goes beyond avoidance of dual entitlement to the
same water-it also facilitates maximum utilization, by, at times, requiring
water users whose rights were created in relation to surface water to switch
to use of groundwater.'
In the East, taking that approach is workable. As noted above, the
"rights" if any that might be affected by the change are somewhat
amorphous. Moreover, there is very little indication that large numbers of
ground remains the state's to allocate via its chosen law. Id. § 4:6. A second "semi-exception" is
in regard to "developed water" in prior appropriation systems, which is considered the
"exclusive property of the developer." Id. § 5:18.
34 Id § 3:60 (stating the core principle of reasonable use riparianism: a use will be allowed if
"under all the circumstances of the case the use of the water by one is reasonable and
consistent with a correspondent enjoyment of right by the other" (quoting Dumont v. Kellogg,
29 Mich. 420, 423 (1874))).
35 See id at §§ 4:6-4:8 (discussing how there are now only two prevailing common law
groundwater doctrines found in the East-American Reasonable Use and the Reasonable Use
standard). Historically, several states, possibly most, had the Absolute Ownership doctrine as
their law, but today that has been replaced in almost all jurisdictions with the possible
exception of Vermont. Id.
36 WATER LAWS COMM., supra note 18.
37 Id at.5 (emphasis added).
38 Id.
39 See Frank J. Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water, 27B ROcKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1853, 1856-W3 (1982) (explaining the various ways in which conjunctive use
can be used to solve different physical and legal problems within the groundwater and surface
water context); Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 934-35 (Colo.
1983) (holding that it may be appropriate for Colorado to require surface stream appropriators
to withdraw underground water to satisfy their surface appropriations).
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users will be presently affected by the change. In recent years," there have
been very few reported cases of groundwater-stream water conflict, which
suggests that at present there are not a large number of cases in which
groundwater-stream water conflicts are preventing water users from
functioning. Integrating the sources by regulatory flat before conflict
becomes more pronounced limits the cases in which the unification of
sources could be challenged by a rights holder as a taking of property.'
Making a challenge to the unification of sources is still less likely to succeed,
since regulated riparianism "grandfathers" existing uses by issuing them
permits that continue the use until the permit expires.
In the West, owing to state-by-state differences in groundwater law, two
principal paths to unification of rights in single sources have arisen. In states
having prior appropriation for both groundwater and surface water, the
choice has been, in effect, to integrate the priorities. In states following the
American Reasonable Use Rule (a modified rule of capture) for
groundwater, the problem has been addressed by a jurisdictional
gerrymander that separates the waters subject to each system to eliminate
overlapping entitlements.4 As described more fully, the jurisdictional
definition of waters as a solution to hydrologic reality can be more effective
(Colorado) 45 or less effective (Arizona).46 Standing alone, what neither of
these solutions to the unification problem achieves, however, is a way to
simultaneously ensure that vast amounts of groundwater remain available
for use despite the hydrological fact that their utilization would adversely
affect the amount of water available to surface water seniors in heavily and
overappropriated streams. "In a dry and thirsty land," less than full
utilization of the available water is anathema, so along with unification that
ensures a single priority system or a separation of the source water into
mutually exclusive pools for allocation, there must be additional doctrines
developed to prevent letting large amounts of available water go unused.
40 In Professor Davis's study, supra note 28, at 189-92, 216-17, most of the eastern
groundwater-stream water cases arose when cities began opening high capacity rural wells that
lowered the local water table and affected nearby rural residents who sued. See, eg, Smith v.
City of Brooklyn, 54 N.E. 787, 787-88 (N.Y. 1899); Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109,
110 (Mich. 1917). In more recent times, city well field activities are regulated and, in general, do
not raise property rights issues because cities have been granted the power of eminent domain
to address their possible interference with competing water rights. Cf SAX, THOMPSON, LESHY &
ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 79-86 (noting cities' use of condemnation and statutory preferences to
secure water supplies).
41 Courts, too, can fashion an integration. See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v.
Nestl6 Waters N. Am. Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 201-02 Mich. Ct. App. (2005), affdin part, rev'd on
other grounds, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
42 WATER LAws COMM., supra note 18, at 70.
4 See TARLOCK, supra note 21, H§ 6:4, 6:16.
4 See id. § §4:7-4:8.
45 See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, Ell, In Search ofSubflow: Arizona's
Phtile Effort to Separate Groundwater from Surface Water, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1994);
John D. Leshy & James Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet; 20 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 657, 659-60 (1988).
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New Mexico, if not the first, was among the earliest states in the West
to integrate its groundwater and surface water laws." The legal mechanism
was relatively simple. New Mexico's statute books contained two separate
authorizations for the granting of water rights from the two sources, both of
which operated on the basis of prior appropriation.48 In Templeton v. Pecos
Valley Artesian Conservancy Distri44 the New Mexico Supreme Court
interpreted the interplay of the surface water and groundwater statutes" to
require the State Engineer to'consider effects on appropriated surface water
in issuing permits to use groundwater: "[Tlhe State Engineer can only grant
permits to appropriate waters which are not already appropriated. The
appellees had certain rights to appropriated [surface] water. When any later
permits were granted by the State Engineer they were subject to the rights of
all prior appropriators from the same source."1 By including as already
appropriated water necessary to feed the streams and sustain the rights of
the surface water seniors, rights created in the groundwater system were
prevented from interfering with the more senior rights created by the
surface water system. The two systems were effectively made one.
Having integrated the two systems, New Mexico still had to address the
problem of full utilization. To understand this problem, focus for the
moment solely on a prior appropriation system for groundwater in which a
vast aquifer of thousands of feet in depth has as its most senior users the
region's first homesteaders who dug wells to depths of twenty or thirty feet
across a wide area. To protect them on the basis of priority would require
the State to forbid any wells that lower the water table below the bottom
hole of those shallow wells, thereby "trapping" vast reserves of water that
otherwise could be extracted and still have plenty of water in the aquifer to
satisfy the uses of both the seniors and the interfering juniors. In this
particular context, the problem of full utilization is sometimes referred to as
47 SAX, THOMPSON, LESHY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 439.
48 N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 ("The unappropriated water of every natural stream . . . within
the state of New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to
appropriation for beneficial use.. .. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right."); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-5-1 (2011) (governing surface water use and appropriation); id. § 72-12-1
(governing underground water appropriation).
49 332 P.2d 465 (N.M. 1958).
50 The groundwater statutes included sections 75-11-3 and 75-114 of the Statutes of New
Mexico, 1953 Compilation (under the 1978 compilation and renumbering these statutes are
found at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-12-3, 72-124). The Templeton court described the authority of
the State Engineer to grant groundwater permits by quoting from those provisions:
[I]f he finds that there are in the underground stream, channel, artesian basin, reservoir
or lake unappropriated waters or that the proposed appropriation would not impair
existing water rights from the source, ... grant the application and issue a permit to the
applicant to appropriate all or a part of the waters applied for, subject to the rights of all
prior appropriators from the source.
Templeton, 332 P.2d at 471 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3 (1997)) (emphasis added). The
statutes further add: "Existing water rights based upon application to beneficial use are hereby
recognized. Nothing herein contained is intended to impair the same or to disturb the priorities
thereof." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12A-13 (1997).
51 Id at 472.
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the problem of the "shallow senior."" The instrumentalist impetus to a
solution, as well as the solution itself, are set forth with a degree of narrative
transparency by the Idaho Legislature:
Ground waters are public waters. The traditional policy of the state of Idaho,
requiring the water resources of this state to be devoted to beneficial use in
reasonable amounts through appropriation, is affirmed with respect to the
ground water resources of this state as said term is hereinafter defined and,
while the doctrine of "first in time is first in right" is recognized, a reasonable
exercise of this right shall not block full economic development of
underground water resources. Prior appropriators of underground water shall
be protected in the maintenance of reasonable ground water pumping levels as
may be established by the director of the department of water resources as
herein provided.
"Reasonable" groundwater pumping levels, in this setting, means that the
protection based on priority attaches only to wells that are dug to a level set
by the State to ensure full utilization. To have their priorities protected,
shallow seniors may be required to deepen their wells.a
Returning to the context at hand, achieving full utilization after merging
the two separate priority systems is problematic in all basins where the
discharge of water from a major aquifer provides an important portion of
streamflow. In this context the shallow senior is not the early homesteader's
shallow well; it is the surface water senior that relies on the hydrologically
connected groundwater to provide base flow to the stream. In many regions,
surface water rights are more senior and had fully appropriated the streams
by the early twentieth century or before.a In that setting, any diminution of
surface flow will harm the seniors, and in many basins any pumping of the
hydrologically linked water will diminish the streamflow. Pumping near a
stream can draw so much water toward the bottom of the well that it is
comparable to sucking water out of the river. Pumping at a greater distance
or at lesser rates can change the hydraulic gradient to slow the rate at which
groundwater feeds the base flow of the river. In more severe cases, pumping
can lower the water table in the aquifer so that it is now lower than the
52 SAx, THOMPSON, LESHY&ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 440.
53 IDAHO CODE ANN. §42-226 (2003). For a judicial solution to the shallow seniors problem,
see Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah 1969) ("[AIIl users are required
where necessary to employ reasonable and efficient means in taking their own waters in
relation to others ... ").
5 Some states have legal mechanisms that shift the cost of well deepening from shallow
domestic well operators to commercial and irrigation well operators. See, e.g, Parker v.
Wallentine, 650 P.2d 648, 656 (Idaho 1982); Prather v. Eisenmann, 261 N.W.2d 766, 770-72
(Neb. 1978) (applying domestic preference statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (2010), to
require compensation).
55 See Todd Reeve & Rob Harmon, Water Restoration Certificates: Voluntary, Market-
Based Flow Restoration, THE WATER REPORT, Sept. 15, 2010, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/COMM_10_09_WaterReport.pdf.
56 See THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT,
MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY 145 (2003).
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bottom of the stream and no water is discharged into the stream that
previously had been fed by groundwater discharge.' What is frequently the
case, however, is that pumping from the aquifer does not impose a 1:1.
reduction in streamflow," so that a total ban on groundwater withdrawal
that has an impact on streamflow of a fully appropriated surface stream
could force vast quantities of water to remain in the ground untapped
without a correspondingly large benefit to the surface water seniors.
For that reason, in New Mexico, administration of the integrated
priority system also posed the need to address full utilization. New Mexico
solved that problem shortly after the Templeton decision was announced,
when the legendary State Engineer Steve Reynolds limited a groundwater
withdrawal request of the City of Albuquerque seeking water that was
hydrologically linked to the fully appropriated Rio Grande to an amount that
he calculated would not interfere with the rights of surface seniors."
There are two back stories that accompany New Mexico's integration of
its ground and surface water systems. The first is that increasing pumping in
the Pecos River valley was interfering with New Mexico's ability to make its
required deliveries to Texas at the state line under the Pecos River
Compact.o The more interesting story of the New Mexico integration of
groundwater and surface water, and also closely linked to the thesis of this
Article, is an account given by Eluid Martinez in a conversation I had with
him about fifteen years ago. Before becoming Commissioner of Reclamation
in 1995, he had spent twenty-three years in the New Mexico State Engineer's
Office, many of them as an assistant to Steve Reynolds."' He recounted
Reynolds's explanation to him of the reason New Mexico had "integrated"
groundwater and surface water priorities." Coming out of the Dust Bowl and
the Great Depression, banks had become hesitant to make loans to New
Mexico farmers who could not demonstrate that their water rights were
dependable.u Shortly after World War II, the introduction of centripetal
57 See generally id. at 143-46 (defining concepts such as lift, drawdown, and cone of
depression, and discussing how stream depletion factors can be used to analyze well pumping
effects on streamflow).
58 See id. at 145-46.
59 See City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 81, 83 (N.M. 1962); G. Emlen Hall, Steve
Reynolds-Portrait of a State Engineer as a Young Artist, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 537, 543-44
(1998). A different motivation for Reynolds's position in City of Albuquerque was the need to
reduce groundwater withdrawals in the Rio Grande basin that were causing noncompliance
with New Mexico's delivery obligations under the Rio Grande Compact. See FRED M. PHILLIPS ET
AL., REINING IN THE Rio GRANDE: PEOPLE, LAND, AND WATER 13540(2010).
60 New Mexico's struggles in that regard eventually led to litigation in which Texas
prevailed. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 572-76 (1983).
61 Eluid Martinez, Comm'r, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Keynote Address at the 45th Annual
New Mexico Water Conference: Water Issues in the West 2 (Dec. 4, 2000), available at
http://wrri.nmsu.edu/publish/watcon/proc45/martinez.pdf.
62 Interview with Eluid Martinez, Comm'r, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, in San Diego, Cal.
(Feb. 20-21, 1997); see also Hall, supm note 59, at 542.
63 IRA G. CLARK, WATER IN NEW MEXICO: A HISTORY OF ITS MANAGEMENT AND USE 235 (1987);
Susan Christopher Nunn, The Political Economy of institutional Change: A Distribution
Citerion forAcceptance of Groundwater Rules, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 867, 882 (1985).
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pumps made possible large scale groundwater withdrawals sufficient to
support a shift from the uncertain yields of dry land farming to the
consistently higher yields obtained using irrigation.' The addition of so
many new high volume groundwater users holding permits issued under the
separate groundwater statute raised uncertainty in regard to the reliability of
the rights of senior surface water users from streams that were being
affected by the pumping." Absent a clear legal precedent protecting the
surface water seniors, the banks began to refuse to lend to the surface water
seniors, due to fear that the later in time pumpers' rights to the water under
the groundwater statute would be deemed superior to that of the surface
water users.& Under that pressure, Steve Reynolds, who had just become
State Engineer in 1955," championed the position accepted in Templeton
that protected water rights based on seniority regardless of whether the
competing claimant was a groundwater pumper or surface water diverter.6
The need for security of right as a precondition for obtaining the capital
necessary to drive a key economic sector drove water law to integrate the
legal regimes governing groundwater and surface water.
Other western states have integrated their hydrologically connected
groundwater and surface water in other ways, not all equally successfully.
The more difficult cases arise in jurisdictions that, unlike New Mexico, do
not follow prior appropriation for both surface water and groundwater.
Those states do not have available the simple expedient of saying that all
rights must respect all priorities already granted in the same water. Colorado
69is a state in which groundwater law is not based exclusively on priority.
Historically and into the present, its groundwater law is based in part on the
modified common law rule of capture that inheres in the American
Reasonable Use doctrine. 0 Colorado, however, limits the amount that can be
withdrawn from any given overlying parcel to the amount of water
underlying the parcel." As noted previously, pursuant to that doctrine, an
64 ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOILIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S
FRESH WATERS 25-26 (2002).
65 See F. Harlan Flint, Groundwater Law and Administration: A New Mexico Viewpoin 14
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 545, 557 (1968) (describing the dilemma faced by senior surface water
users in light of increased groundwater pumping).
66 See id at 557-58 (explaining the problem faced by senior surface water users and the
solution effected by the Templeton Doctrine); cf J.W. Milliman, Water Law and Private
Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J.L. & ECON. 41, 47 (1959) (discussing the discouraging effect
uncertainty has on investment).
67 Hall, supra note 59, at 542 (detailing Reynolds's long career as New Mexico's renowned
State Engineer).
68 Templeton v. Pecos Valley, 332 P.2d 465, 471 (N.M. 1958).
69 See Colorado Ground Water Management Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (2011).
70 See Dean Baxtresser, Note, Antiques Roadshow: The Common Law and the Coming Age
of Groundwater Marketing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 773, 779-81 (2010).
71 "[Generally ... the amount of water available is that amount of unappropriated water,
exclusive of artificial recharge, underlying the land owned by the applicant or underlying land
owned by another who has consented to the applicant's withdrawal." JOSEPH (JODY) GRANTHAM,
COLO. Div. OF WATER RES., SYNOPSIS OF COLORADO WATER LAW 11 (5th ed. 2011), available at
http://water.state.co.us/DWRIPub/DWR%20General%20Documents/SynopsisOfCOWaterLaw.pdf.
The annual amount allowed to be withdrawn is based on a 100-year useful life of the aquifer. Id.
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owner of land overlying an aquifer has a right to make use of that water
without liability to others so long as the water is used on-tract for any
reasonable use.72 In this context the reasonableness is determined solely in
relation to the nature of the use, not in relation to the harm that might be
caused to other users of the same water source.7 ' Thus, if the groundwater is
hydrologically linked to surface flows, a groundwater user exercising rights
pursuant to the American Reasonable Use doctrine could adversely affect
earlier in time surface water appropriators.
Colorado has avoided that problem by adopting a variegated approach.
Indeed, Colorado is an almost perfect example of developmentally driven
instrumentalism pushing the law into ingenious solutions that provide both
reliable water rights and full utilization in a complex, linguistically baffling
combination that efficiently gets the most out of each groundwater basin
(although it does create a substantial amount of work for water lawyers,
which is not all bad). Viewed from a high level, Colorado solves the initial
problem of competing entitlements to the hydrologically connected
groundwater and surface water by forcing almost all hydrologically linked
water-the pumping of which would affect stream flows-into the surface
water system. The simple device was first made part of Colorado's water law
by separate groundwater and surface water legislation passed in the 1960s."
As construed by the Colorado Supreme Court, the legislature intended to
create administrative control over groundwater and water court authority
over surface water. 6 This division was necessary to effectuate the Colorado
Constitution's guarantee, applicable to the "water of every natural stream,""
that the "right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
beneficial uses shall never be denied."' Colorado statutes were explicit:
"'Waters of the state' means all surface and underground water in or
tnbutary to all natural streams within the state of Colorado, except
[designated groundwater, defined in] section 37-90-103(6)."'9
Defining what water was tributary required further effort, with statutes
currently defining nontributary groundwater as,
[G]round water, located outside the boundaries of any designated ground
water basins in existence on January 1, 1985, the withdrawal of which will
72 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
73 See SAx, THOMPSON, LESHY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 415.
74 See Colorado Ground Water Management Act, COLO. REV. STAT. H§ 37-90-101 to -143
(2011); Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-
101 to -602 (2011).
75 See, e.g., Colo. Dep't Natural Res. v. Sw. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294,
1307-18 (Colo. 1983) (en banc), superseded by statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203 (2011), as
recognized in Humphrey v. Sw. Dev. Co., 734 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (history of
tributary and nontributary groundwater in Colorado).
76 Id
77 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
78 Id. § 6.
79 COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(13) (2011) (emphasis added).
80 The governance of "designated ground water basins" is another example of Colorado's
pragmatic approach to groundwater use maximization. Those basins contain water that is
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not, within one hundred years of continuous withdrawal, deplete the flow of a
natural stream, ... at an annual rate greater than one tenth of one percent of
the annual rate of withdrawal.81
Adopting so narrow a definition of what hydrologically linked waters are
nontributary and thus excluded from surface water administration, if fully
enforced, would guarantee no meaningful conflict between water rights
claimants under the two competing property regimes. The jurisdictional
gerrymander, including all groundwater that has any significant effect on
stream flow in the surface water system, integrates the two systems.
Pragmatically, as noted before, adopting a broad view of what waters
are tributary to surface streams that have long been fully appropriated risks
locking up and preventing utilization of vast amounts of groundwater.
Moreover, doing so would run contrary to what long has been the State's
water policy, often described by the Colorado Supreme Court as "maximum
utilization."2 As the Colorado Supreme Court perceived the problem, letting
the surface water seniors prevent all use of tributary groundwater was
tantamount to waste:
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions that, along with vested fights,
there shall be maximum utilization of the water of this state. As administration
of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon the new
drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be
integrated into the law of vested fights. We have known for a long time that the
doctrine was lurking in the backstage shadows as a result of the accepted,
though oft violated, principle that the right to water does not give the right to
waste it.8
nontributary. See id. § 37-90-103(6)(a). Designated basins principally are ones in which there is
little or no recharge so that water being withdrawn is being mined and the maximization issue is
how rapidly to allow the water to be removed in order to obtain the greatest benefit of the
nonrenewable supply. See Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 468 P.2d 835, 839
(Colo. 1970) (en banc). The limits on pumping are imposed via permits issued by the Colorado
Groundwater Commission, under a standard that does not allow "unreasonable lowering of the
water level ... beyond reasonable economic limits of withdrawal or use." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-
90-107(5) (2011). To give meaning to that standard, the Commission develops standards for
each designated basin, most of which rely on the Three-Mile Circle Test. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-
90-107(5); see also Fndingsland, 468 P.2d at 836-37. That test draws a three-mile radius circle
around a well for which a permit is sought, and depending on the other characteristics of the
aquifer, denies a permit if the combined draft of the wells within the circle will exceed a 40%
depletion of the available water with a certain number of years. Fundingsland, 468 P.2d at 836.
For example, for the Northern High Plains Ogallala Aquifer, the current standard uses the 40%,
three-mile approach and assigns 100 years as the measuring time. GRANTHAM, supra note 71, at
10. Other basins, such as the one considered in the Flndingsland case, have had depletion
periods set as short as 25 years. Fundingsland, 468 P.2d at 837.
81 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (2011).
82 Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
83 Id
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A number of additional adjustments to the law had to be made, some of
which clearly were authorized by statute4 and some were permitted by the
State Engineer.u While the latitude given to the State Engineer has now been
severely restricted by court decisions and statutory amendmentsw Colorado
also has authorized a principal method for achieving full utilization, the plan
for augmentation."
Plans for augmentation permit out-of-priority diversion so long as the
person making that diversion increases the water supply to replace those
out-of-priority depletions sufficiently to ensure that no harm is done to
senior users.8 In many situations of hydrologically linked groundwater and
surface water, as seen in the New Mexico City of Albuquerque example,
tapping groundwater often does not result in a gallon-for-gallon reduction in
surface water flows.' Thus, even if a plan for augmentation required
immediate purchase of replacement water,"o if the impact on the stream is
far less than 1:1 and the physical location of the out-of-priority use is far
enough upstream, return flow from the new use alone might satisfy the
augmentation requirement. If the streanflow effects are not to be felt for
many years, no immediate replacement water will be needed, with
replacements to start at a later date. In all of these cases, the net amount of
water being used is increased, which is a more maximal utilization.
Augmentation plans have to be accurate-Colorado measures the
amounts of replacement water required to the 1/100th of an acre-foot.' to
measure groundwater-stream water impacts with that degree of precision
requires expensive hydrogeologic data collection and modeling, reaching
into the tens of thousands of dollars and more.02 Add to that the high
transaction costs of Water Court adjudication if the plan for augmentation
faces challenges by senior users (often institutional parties-such as cities
or water districts and user associations-able to spread the cost of litigation).
8 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
85 See Lain Strawn, The Last GASP: The Confict over Management of Replacement Waterin
the South Platte River Basin, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 597, 609-19 (2004); Empire Lodge
Homeowner's Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1159 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (holding that practices
allowed exceeded state engineer's authority); see also Simpson v. BUou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d
50, 71-72 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the State Engineer did not exceed his authority
when promulgating rules and regulations under his compact rule power, subject to statutory
restrictions).
86 See Strawn, supra note 85, at 620-30. The legislature tightened control over the State
Engineer by passing H.B. 02-1414 in 2002 and S.B. 03-73 in 2003, both of which are now codified
as part of section 37-92-308. 2002 Colo. Legis. Serv., ch. 151 (West) (H.B. 02-1414); 2003 Colo.
Legis. Serv., ch. 204 (West) (S.B. 03-073); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308 (2011).
87 COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2011).
88 Id. § 37-92-305(8)(c); EmpireLodge Homeowner'sAss'n, 39 P.3d at 1150.
89 See City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 81 (N.M. 1962).
90 For example, this could be accomplished by buying out a senior upstream agricultural
water right and retiring it so that it never leaves the stream.
91 See, e.g, Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 290-
91 (Colo. 1976) (en banc) (calculating amounts such as 89.97 acre-feet per year necessary for
adequate replacement).
92 See Martin v. Shell Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319 (D. Conn. 2002) (stating that
hydrogeologic surveys were cost-prohibitive at a price of $70,000-100,000).
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The total of those fees and the risk of being denied the augmentation
threaten to inhibit economic growth and maximum utilization."3
This was particularly problematic as it impacted the potential
development of residential subdivisions and the associated commercial
projects in the ever-growing Denver to Fort Collins Front Range metroplex:
Greatly aided by the regional hydrogeology, the legislature acted upon the
documented homogeneity of the Front Range Denver Basin aquifers to
provide what is essentially a presumption about the required amount of
augmentation.' The aquifers are artesian aquifers, having their recharge
areas high in the Rockies, and, importantly, each has had relatively
consistent artesian pressure throughout the areas in which the aquifer was
being tapped." Somewhat regardless of the location, sinking a well into one
of these aquifers reduces the remaining artesian pressure in the aquifer by
an amount proportional to the quantity of water withdrawn. 6
Correspondingly, that reduction in artesian pressure translates into a like
effect on the rate of transmission of water from the aquifer into the streams
of the East Slope.97 Thus, the amount of augmentation required for
withdrawals (other than those so close to a stream as to directly influence
its flow) could be calculated with reasonable accuracy without the need of
93 Augmentation plans still must be scrutinized very closely to ensure that the rights being
used to augment the supply are rights to "wet" water that have actually been in use, rather than
paper rights from old decrees that actually have not been used or used less water than decreed.
This makes some augmentation cases very complex. See, e.g, Burlington Ditch Reservoir &
Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645, 661-62 (Colo. 2011) (en banc).
94 See Jeffrey J. Kahn, The Continuing Groundwater Saga-Part 1: Senate Bill 5, 15 COLO.
LAw. 422, 428 (1986) (discussing the requirement of judicial approval of an augmentation plan
prior to the use of Denver Basin groundwater to prevent injury to the aquifer); Ramsey L. Kropf,
Colorado Groundwater Law: Colorado's System-Integration (or Not?) of Groundwater and
Surface Water, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7B-1, 7B-4, 7B-6, 7B-8, 7B-11 to -12 (2003) (discussing
Colorado's historical view of groundwater and the current protection of senior users' rights
through augmentation); Eric Ryan Potyondy, Sustaining the Unsustainable: Development of the
Denver Basin Aquifers, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 121, 127, 131-32, 135-36, 148 (2005)
(describing the Denver Basin Aquifers, their homogenous classification and treatment by
Colorado lawmakers, senior appropriators' rights, and the requirement to protect those rights
and reach the goal of 100 years of future aquifer use through the requirement of
replacement water).
95 See Potyondy, supra note 94, at 123-25, for a discussion of the typical artesian flow from
the Denver Basin aquifers, and how different physical characteristics-size, geography, and
wall thickness and permeability-impact artesian pressure in the aquifer system. It should be
noted, however, that as a result of ever increasing groundwater pumping that has occurred in
the Denver Basin since the early 1800s, artesian pressure and natural discharge has decreased
significantly over time, thus reducing or eliminating natural discharge into streams and alluvial
aquifers. Id. at 126. Considerable losses in pressure were observed as early as the mid-1890s,
while the number of wells drilled in the Denver Basin by 1895 was nearly 400. RALF TOPPER &
BOB RAYNOLDS, COLO. FOUND. FOR WATER EDUC., CITIZEN's GUIDE TO DENVER BASIN
GROUNDWATER 13 (2007), available at http://www.waterexchange.com/UserFilesFle/dataRoom/
Citizens Guide toDenverBasin-Groundwater.pdf.
96 Arthur L. Rusch, Note, South Dakota's Artesian Pressure-Should It Be a Protected
Means of'Diversion, 16 S.D. L. REV. 481, 482-84 (1971).
97 See id; see also Kropf, supra note 94, at 7B-8.
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individualized modeling and data collection. 8 By introducing presumptive
augmentation amounts, the cost of calculating them individually is avoided
in many cases.
Having found an instrumentalist solution for achieving maximum
utilization of the hydrologically linked groundwater found on the East Slope
near the Denver metroplex-inexpensive administratively calculated
augmentation requirements-the legislature, in addition to authorizing such
a process, found itself faced with a conundrum of terminology. The
groundwater involved was understood to have too much impact on
streamflow to qualify as nontributary, but it was to be governed by rules
other than those applicable to groundwater that is considered tributary
because using the water did not involve mining of a designated basin." The
term chosen by the legislature to denominate that developmentally valuable
groundwater was to call it "not nontributary. ""0
Thus, by differing paths, the laws of states in the West have converged
with laws of states in the East to manage hydrologically linked waters as
one. This responds to the instrumentalist imperative of having secure,
nonconflicting water entitlements. The methods chosen were different-but
both regions now have the means to recognize the physical realities of
groundwater and stream water interactions.
III. ELIMINATION OF SITUS OF USE REQUIREMENTS-RIPARIANISM CATCHES UP
In the era of the founding of the American West and up until the time of
inexpensive high capacity groundwater extraction, if the vast expanses of
nonriparian land were to receive water and be productive, the water law of
the region could not forbid uses off the riparian tract.o' In contrast, in the
humid East, where dry land farming (i.e., without irrigation) was practicable,
and streams were plentiful, there was not a parallel pressing need for using
water away from tracts that were riparian to the watercourse. 0 2 Even so, a
prodevelopmental policy and an inclination to maximize benefits from the
use of water invited a relaxation of the strict limitations on the situs of use
of water imposed by the traditional common law of natural flow riparianism
imported from England.o' To give a simple example, some uses require
98 TOPPER & RAYNOLDS, supra note 95, at 17.
99 Seeid.
100 Id; see COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-103(10.7) (2011).
101 Act of Mar. 3, 1877 (Desert Land Act), Pub. L. No. 57-161, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323, 325, 327-329 (2006)) is a prime example of the promotion of
reclamation of arid and semi-arid public lands in western states for private irrigation
development. Karl S. Landstrom, Reclamation Under the Desert-LandAct, 36 J. FARM ECON. 500,
500 (1954). In addition to giving incentives (via discounted land values) to private developers
that promised to irrigate, more than 10 million acres of public lands were patented under the
Act through 1953, many of which served as federal sites for supplemental water supply and
reclamation projects. See id.
102 See generally Abrams, supra note 1 (discussing the geography of the East and its
influence on the development of water rights).
103 Id. at 1399-1400.
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riparian location, such as for a wharf or the launching of recreational
watercraft. Even so, there is no reason why other businesses, farms, or
homes are not made more valuable and productive by being allowed to make
beneficial use of a nearby lake or stream to which they are not riparian as a
source of water supply, rather than obtaining water that can be used to
enhance productivity or value m more expensive ways.
In different states at different times, the law relaxed to what is
sometimes called the on-tract limitation.'" Seen from afar, it is as if there
was a series of stages in the East, each a little more liberal, allowing more
rights to make water use away from riparian parcels. The following table is a
rough representation of the stages.
Era Legal Doctrine Water Use Result
Any nonriparian use was
per se unreasonable and
English natural was subject to liability at
flow riparianism the suit of any riparian
without a showing of
irJ r105injuryto
Pragmatic approach Liability for a nonriparian
Nineteenth century prior to full transition to use required proof of
reasonable use actual injury'0o
Dawn of the twentiethi If use made by a riparian,
or with the support of a
century eventually Reasonable use
riparian, the situs of usebecoming almost riparianism rpratestso sbneo alm adoes not make the use
unreasonable...
ASCE Regulated Situs of use is irrelevant as
Presently arriving Riparianism Model long as means of obtaining
Water Code access to water is lawfula8
104 TEX. WATER DEV. BD., REPORT 361, 100 YEARS OF THE RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 12-13 (William F. Mullican, III & Suzanne Schwartz eds.,
2004), available at http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/numbered-reports/doc/
R361/R361.pdf.
105 See, e.g., Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J. 460, 461-63 (1795). Professor Tarlock suggests that this
era lasted into the early 20th century in some states. See TARLOCK, supra note 21, § 3:50 (citing
McCarter v. Hudson Cnty. Water Co., 61 A. 710 (N.J. Ch. 1905)).
106 Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 193 (1852); Stratton v. Mt. Hermon
Boys' Sch., 103 N.E. 87, 88 (Mass. 1913).
107 See, eg, Gillis v. Chase, 31 A. 18, 19 (N.H. 1892). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
adopts this rule for uses made by a riparian. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 (1977).
Section 857 confers the same status on uses made by nonriparians pursuant to a right granted
by a riparian, a government, or a right as a member of the public. Section 856 adds a gloss that if
the harmed party is a nonriparian who does not enjoy a grant from a riparian to use the water, a
right granted by government, or a right as a member of the public, there would be no liability
even if the use of a riparian is unreasonable.
108 WATER LAWS COMM., supra note 18, at 27.
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By the end of the progression, treating the ASCE Regulated Riparianism
Model Water Code as the eventual template for the East, the legal rule has
turned a full 180 degrees to embrace results almost identical to those long
achieved by prior appropriation.'w The East gradually swung from a rule of
per se unreasonableness of off-tract uses, to a rule placing no limits on situs
of water use other than those that measure the proposed off-tract use as to
its reasonableness and permit-worthiness in common with on-tract uses."
Eliminating the on-tract requirement allowed the prodevelopmental
consequence of making the water available to support all water uses,
without regard to contiguity of the water course.
IV. RECOGNITION OF INSTREAM AND COMMUNITARIAN VALUES-PRIOR
APPROPRIATION CATCHES UP (AND OREGON GETS AHEAD)
Other than in drought years, the East has enjoyed ample water in
almost all its range and has little experience with ecological destruction
caused by overuse of the water resource."' That is not to say that harbingers
of endemic overuse of water are absent in the East-there are many early
signs such as saltwater intrusion in coastal areas,112 dramatic water table
declines draining lakes and robbing streams of their flow in places as diverse
as Massachusetts and Florida,"' and an increasing number of riparian and
estuarine species that are now endangered or threatened."4 So while the
109 The remaining difference is in granting access to nonriparians to initiate use. In the West,
where there was a threat of self-interest monopolization or charging unreasonable tariffs for
entry, private condemnation of access is allowed. In the East, where streams and opportunities
for access to water are so plentiful, the only contexts in which there is evidence of concerted
action by riparians trying to limit access is in regard to recreational use. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 474-76 (Mich. 1967).
110 The REGULATED RIPARIANISM MODEL WATER CODE adds the caveat that it creates some
barriers to interbasin transfers. The Code states: "The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code
does not entirely abandon the notion of preferences for uses within the watershed for the Code
provides protections against interbasin transfers. The Code provides a special standard for
interbasin transfers designed to afford real protection to the basin of origin... . Even with those
preferences in place, however, the Code does not prohibit interbasin transfers. Rather, the Code
provides for compensation to the basin of origin through an Interbasin Compensation Fund."
WATER LAWS COMM., supra note 18, at 26.
1l See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1383. This assessment excludes water quality concerns, such
as the growing dead zones just offshore of major estuaries, which may well rate as ecological
disasters on par with, for example, the devastation caused by the dewatering of the Owens
Valley in California. Cf id. (discussing only issues of water demand, not concerns of
water quality). See also, e.g., Darryl Fears, Alarming 'Dead Zone' Grows in the Chesapeake,
WASH. POST, July 24, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/alarming-
dead-zone-grows-in-the-chesapeake/2011/07/20/gQABRmKXI_story.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2011).
112 See, e.g, Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So.2d 732, 737 (Ala. 1995).
113 See, eg, GLENNON, supra note 64, at 60; U.S. Geological Survey, Dep't of the Interior,
Groundwater Depletion Across the Nation (2003), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-103-03/
JBartolinoFS%282.13.04%29.pdf.
114 For example, one of the claims of the downstream states in the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River controversy centered on having sufficient water to support mussels
and sturgeon. See, e.g, Florida's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
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water resource base of the East is far from pristine or un-degraded, at the
macro level it still possesses functioning ecosystems. Protecting the public
uses and public interest in the East's water resources is predominantly a
matter of preventing dewatering and destruction of that resource coupled.
with selective restorations and enhancement efforts."" The legal bulwark for
preventing overuse and ecological destruction can be found in the East's
emerging water law, while the palliatives for degraded systems require
programmatic efforts, some of which, such as Everglades restoration, are
already underway."1
The commitment to the public interest, including ecological integrity
(but leavened with a healthy dose of prodevelopmental instrumentalism), of
the Regulated Riparianism Model Water Code could hardly be more
prominent. Its initial section proclaims:
The waters of the State are a natural resource owned by the State in trust for
the public and subject to the State's sovereign power to plan, regulate, and
control the withdrawal and use of those waters, under law, in order to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare by promoting economic growth,
mitigating the harmful effects of drought, resolving conflicts among
competing water users, achieving balance between consumptive and
nonconsumptive uses of water, encouraging conservation, preventing
excessive degradation of natural environments, and enhancing the productivity
of water-related activities."'
The Code further includes an express requirement that the ecologically vital
minimum levels and flows not only be set, but be "preserved""8 by reserving
water from allocation."' Permits for use of water are limited by an
ecologically conceived notion of safe yield.120 Even more explicitly, for the
permitting agency to consider a water use to be reasonable, it must take into
account public interest factors, including among others general ecological
effects, sustainable development, domestic and municipal uses, groundwater
on Endangered Species Act Claims at 26-27, Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 441 F. Supp.
2d 1123 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (No. CV-90-BE-1331-E).
115 See Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Floida, 61 FIA. L.
REv. 403, 442-43 (2009).
116 Mary Doyle, Implementing Everglades Restoration, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59, 62-
63 (2001).
117 WATER LAWS COMM., supra note 18, at 1-2.
118 "The State shall preserve minimum flows and levels in all water sources as necessary to
protect the appropriate biological, chemical, and physical integrity of water sources by
reserving such waters from allocation and by authorizing additional protections of the waters of
the State." Id at 18.
119 The full scope of protections for the ecological values can be seen in numerous places,
including definitions of key terms such as biological integrity, chemical integrity, physical
integrity, public interest, and safe yield. See id at 33-53. Permits are limited by the concept of
safe yield and reasonable use. Id at 236-37. For the permitting agency to consider a water use
to be reasonable it must take into account public interest factors. See id. at 240-41.
120 Id. at 53, 236-37.
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recharge, waste assimilation, other aspects of water quality, and wetland and
flood plains.121
In the West, adding consideration of instream flows and communitarian
interests, sometimes combined under the broad heading of the public
interest, faced severe structural legal obstacles, almost from the very
beginning. In many western states, particularly the intermountain states,u
the right to obtain use of water by appropriation is constitutionally
protected, exemplified by ringing language like that of the Colorado
Constitution: "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied."2 3
Squaring that sort of uncompromising constitutional language with any
method that denies appropriation of water to ensure that water remains in
place for ecological purposes, or to serve some other communitarian public
interest need, is a difficult task indeed. Constitutional amendment, of
course, could clear the way, but the research for this Article uncovered no
indication that any western state has considered repealing its prior
appropriation provision. Thus, if ecology and broader public interests are to
be protected by the state against dewatering of streams from unfettered
private appropriation, a change is needed. At a popular level, Western
attitudes are in the process of changing. Protecting riparian habitats and
associated wetlands to some essential degree is accepted now as a widely
shared public desideratum, 2 4 a potential economic boon in sustaining
activities taking advantage of the West's great outdoor resources.2 5 In some
cases, preservation of streamflow is recognized as appropriate policy that
supports contemporary forms of economic development, including
migration of people into the region and recreational industries, as well as
responding to an ever more clearly perceived ecological imperative.2 6
In moving along that path, one of the early methods to preserve
instream flows in some western states was to permit appropriated water to
be left in place.127 That work-around had two problems. Linguistically, it
might impinge on the "divert and appropriate" right by placing diversions in
121 Id. at 240-41 (the subset of factors set out in the text are drawn from subsection (e)(1)-(7)).
122 California does not have such a provision and its unique water history and law have
created a mixed system of riparianism and prior appropriation. What the California Constitution
does have is a 20th century full utilization amendment added in 1928 that specifically recognizes
the public interest. Initially found at CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (1928), currently codified at CAL.
CONST. art. X, § 2.
123 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
124 See generally NAT'L WATER COMM'N, NEw DIRECTIONS IN U.S. WATER POuCY: SUMMARY,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1973) (discussing the National Water Commission's
finding that national values differ greatly from the time when the federal government took on
control of inland waterways).
125 See, e.g., Rebecca Abelh, Instream Flows, Recreation as Beneficial Use, and the Public
Interestin Colorado Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 517, 518 (2005).
126 Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail Achterman, Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon's
Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1138-39 (2006).
127 Seeid. at 1140, 1143.
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competition with uses that were not initiated by diversions.'2 Additionally,
eliminating the diversion requirement risked monopolization of the waters
and speculation by instream appropriators who could obtain valuable water
rights with virtually no required investment in order to leave the water
in place.
The diversion requirement has a long and somewhat storied history.
The most famous diversion requirement case arose early in the twentieth
century. It involved a resort near Colorado Springs that invested in various
improvements to its property, which was made attractive by a beautiful
waterfall. 2" When an upstream power company interfered with the flow to
the falls, the resort company lost its claim to have the falls continued for
want of a physical diversion of the water.'" The view that diversion was a
required element of making an appropriation persisted throughout many
states of the West. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court in 1972 stated:
"Other cases, both before and after Genoa [v. Westfal'], have held that the
first essential of an appropriation of water is the actual diversion of water
with intent to apply it to a beneficial use."32
Parsed carefully, the typical western state's constitutional requirement
does not forbid other forms of appropriation, only that the one particular
method not be denied. Thus, despite the steady stream of decisions requiring
diversion, dispensing with the diversion requirement could be justified on
nonconstitutional grounds as a revision of the common law of prior
appropriation, which traditionally has as its four requirements for perfecting
an appropriation: 1) diversion, 2) of unappropriated water, 3) from a natural
stream, 4) for beneficial use.'3 At the beginning of the last quarter of the
twentieth century, legislatures with the subsequent approval of courts began
to resolve the issue in favor of instream appropriation.'? The leading
example, a major event when it was decided, came from Idaho, where the
legislature in 1971 permitted a state agency to appropriate instream flows in
Malad Canyon under very narrowly described conditions."5 The statute was
challenged in a case most often referred to as Idaho Parks.'3 The majority
ruled clearly on the point-diversion is not a constitutional requirement for
allowing an appropriative right to be created-even though that had never
been authorized before the statute being reviewed: "[O]ur Constitution
does not require actual physical diversion. We deem it clear that until the
128 It also was argued that instream uses were not beneficial uses, a proposition that today
seems extremely wooden. See, eg, State Dep't Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin. (Idaho
Parks), 530 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Idaho 1974).
129 Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1913).
130 Id. at 125, 129.
131 Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 349 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1960).
132 Lamont v. Riverside Irrigation Dist., 498 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Colo. 1972) (en banc).
133 Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the
Pacific North west, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation, 28 ENVTL. L. 881, 886 (1998).
134 Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western United
States, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 177, 179-80 (1998).
135 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-4307 (2006).
136 See, e.g, Idaho Parks, 530 P.2d 924, 925, 927-28 (Idaho 1974).
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time of the enactment of the statute in question herein Idaho's statutory
scheme regulating the appropriation of water has contemplated an actual
physical diversion." 7
The dissent of Justice McQuade contended that the words "divert and
appropriate"'" were to be read as a single term, and, therefore, forbade
appropriations that did not begin with a diversion," a position that has
been rejected by several courts that have considered parallel
constitutional provisions.4 o
As mentioned above, the second issue related to instream
appropriations is preventing them from becoming a wholesale giveaway of
the resource to virtually any applicant who can make a showing that the
instream flows are beneficial. This has proved to be a nonissue at one level
because there is still a diversion requirement in the absence of legislation
allowing appropriation without diversion."' Far from being naive about the
problem, vested interests favoring continued access to as much
unappropriated water as possible have ensured that the legislation allowing
instream diversions tightly controls the situations in which it is allowed and
the amounts of water that can be appropriated for instream flow.142 Most
states allow only state agencies to make the instream appropriations,143 and
place significant limits on those agencies.'" For present purposes, the issue
is not overgenerous instream appropriation laws, nor is it even whether
the laws go far enough to protect vital public instream values. The real
issue is that the West has found a way to adapt its water law to include
instream values.
Complementing the protection of instream flow via appropriation, more
and more states of the West are adopting unabashed public interest elements
in their water laws. Among the most often cited exemplars are Alaska'4 and
Idaho,'" neither of which is often described as a hotbed of
antidevelopmental zeal and both of which are regarded as strong property
rights states. Alaska takes the laundry list approach, setting forth public
interest elements that are to be taken into consideration by the state agency
in acting on applications for appropriations:
(a) The commissioner shall issue a permit if the commissioner finds that
(1) rights of a prior appropriator will not be unduly affected;
(2) the proposed means of diversion or construction are adequate;
137 Id. at 928.
18 Id at 935 (McQuade, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 934-35.
140 See, e.g., In reApplication A-16642, 463 N.W.2d 591, 602 (Neb. 1990).
141 Id. at 603.
142 See id. at 603-06.
143 TARLOCK, supra note 21, § 5:28.
144 See, e.g, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-4307 (2006) (prohibiting the parks and recreation board
from collecting fees for appropriations of waters in Malad Canyon).
145 AIASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2010).
146 See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-203A(5)(e), 42-1501 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
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(3) the proposed use of water is beneficial; and
(4) the proposed appropriation is in the public interest.
(b) In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall consider
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational opportunities;
(4) the effect on public health;
(5) the effect of loss of alternate uses of water that might be made within a reasonable
time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed appropriation;
(6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation; and
(8) the effect upon access to navigable or public water.'
Idaho takes a narrative approach to public interest:
The legislature of the state of Idaho hereby declares that the public health,
safety and welfare require that the streams of this state and their environments
be protected against loss of water supply to preserve the minimum stream
flows required for the protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life,
recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation values, and water
quality. The preservation of the water of the streams of this state for such
purposes when made pursuant to this act is necessary and desirable for all the
inhabitants of this state, is in the public interest and is hereby declared to be a
beneficial use of such water.14
Giving a further dimension to that declaration, a separate simultaneously
enacted directive requires that the local public interest also must be taken
into account in ruling on permit applications."'
As was the case with the historic break from the diversion requirement
of prior appropriation law recounted above, the introduction of broad public
interest limitations on future water use in the West is a trend that is well
underway.'? While there may be states, such as Colorado, that are later to
the game and more resistant to explicitly recognizing those public values as
147 ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2010).
148 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 (2003).
149 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e) (2003 & Supp. 2011) (first discussed and upheld in
Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 447-50 (Idaho 1985)).
150 See, e.g, David H. Getches, Water Planning Untapped Opportunity for the Western
States, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1, 33-35 (1988); Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water
Right Allocation and 7)ansfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681,
683, 685 (1987).
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part of the legal fabric,'' even those states are coming to the conclusion that
full utilization of a state's water does not require dewatering of the streams
via appropriation:
In turn, the objective of maximum use administration, under the prior
appropriation system, is to achieve "optimum use" in every appropriator's
utilization of the water. § 37-92-501(2)(e) ("[AIll rules and regulations shall
have as their objective the optimum use of water consistent with preservation
of the priority system of water rights."). Maximum utilzation does not mean
that every ounce of Colorado's natural stream water ought to be appropriated;
optimum use can be achieved only through proper regard for all significant
factors, including environmental and economic concerns.'52
In regard to instream flow protection, Oregon has long held a
leadership role among the western states. As early as 1915 Oregon forbade
out of stream appropriations from the streams that fed the waterfalls in the
Columbia River Gorge. " In 1955, Oregon passed a law-first in the nation-
protecting instream flow for ecological purposes.'" That law was successful,
but in the words of Janet Neuman and two co-authors:
Oregon's flowing streams are still in jeopardy, despite the fact that the state
eventually set more than 550 minimum streamflows by administrative rule.
Implementation problems, political compromises, and a deck stacked in favor
of consumptive water uses contributed to the failure of Oregon's much-
heralded code changes to fulfill their promise of putting fish and other
instream water uses on an equal basis with diversionary, consumptive uses."
Quite recently, Oregon has returned to the field with a new experiment that
is specifically directed at protecting "peak flows""' and "ecological flows""
as part of a broader concept of "net environmental public benefit.""' The
statute did not define those terms more specifically, but the major white
paper study document'" exploring those concepts did, defining peak and
ecological flows as "instream flows needed to sustain ecosystem functions
that native fish and wildlife species require to survive and flourish. These
151 See, e.g, Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd., 929 P.2d 718, 725-26
(Colo. 1996) (en banc).
152 Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 314 (Colo. 2007)
(en banc) (emphasis added). Justice Gregory Hobbs, author of the majority opinion, is a
champion of strict adherence to the fundamental precepts of prior appropriation law. See, eg.,
Empire Lodge Homeowners Ass'n, 39 P.3d 1139, 1146-47 (Colo. 2002) (en banc); Santa Fe Trail
Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53-55 (Colo. 1999) (en banc).
153 See Act of Feb. 9,1915, ch. 36, 1915 Or. Laws 49.
154 Neuman, Squier & Achterman, supra note 126, at 1137-40.
155 Id. at 1148 (footnote omitted).
156 OR. REV. STAT. § 541.600(2)(d) (2011).
157 Id § 541.600(2)(e).
15 Id. § 541.600(2).
159 PHIL WARD, DIR., OR. WATER RES. DEP'T, PEAK & ECOLOGICAL FLow TECHNICAL ADVISORY
COMM., WHITE PAPER: PEAK AND ECOLOGICAL FLOW; A SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING
OREGON HB 3369 (2010), available atwwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/EFIAGFinal.pdf.
2012] 89
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
streamflows include baseflows and flow protections over a range of flows
that provide habitat maintenance and other ecological functions.""O Drilling
deeper, the white paper looks at the types of flows that provide the varied
water stages that protect the ecosystem, including concepts of subsistence
flow, base flow, high flow pulse, overbank flow, biological triggering flow,
and habitat maintenance flow.' For now, the new standard is not widely
applicable because the 2009 legislation that added these provisions, Oregon
H.B. 3369,162 limited their applicability to water projects receiving grants and
loans from the state."
Common threads are pushing East and West together in the protection
of ecological stability. Both regions are demonstrating broad recognition of
the disruptive nature of modem developmental uses of water, particularly in
light of the added ecological stresses being placed on riparian environments
by the unfolding changes in the patterns of water availability and loss of
stationarity associated with climate change."" In the East, for example,
where the effects of dams and diversions are less acute and perhaps less
obvious than in the West, the Regulated Riparianism Model Water Code
Preface describes the "main threats to the availability of water in the eastern
States" as being a result of "the physical and ecological transformation by
human intervention of water sources and the lands on or in which the
sources are found."'64 In the West, adding to the long acknowledged issues of
dewatering is the realization that historic patterns of water availability are
changing in ways that require further adaptation. For example, the preamble
to Oregon H.B. 3369 notes as a prominent reason for its enactment that,
"climate change is expected to alter the timing and form of precipitation in
Oregon."6 Plainly, both East and West are taking a more holistic view of the
water resource as they enact the laws that will define the rights to use water
into the middle of this century. They are converging in giving greater regard
to the public interest in maintaining healthy riparian ecosystems.
V. CONCLUSION
What has been said traces several ways in which the water law of the
American East and West have come together despite the fundamental
underlying differences in rights formulation. The East still begins its
160 Id. at 27.
161 Id. at 4-7.
162 H.B. 3369, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
163 One commentator views this limited scope of applicability as the portal to widespread
application of these concepts. See Douglas MacDougal, Brave New World of Oregon Water Law:
Mandated Peak and Ecological Flows, MARTEN L. NEWSL., Jan. 20, 2011,
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110120-oregon-water-law-new-world (last visited Feb.
18, 2012).
164 See discussion supranotes 111-17, 151.
165 WATER LAWS COMM., supra note 18, at ix. The Code does not mention climate change. Id.
As a member of the drafting committee, I can attest this was a deliberate compromise due to
the lack of unanimity of view within the committee at the time.of its drafting in the early 1990s.
166 H.B. 3369, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009)
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entitlement system from a perspective that the resource is to be shared
among those able to use it; the West, in the main, still begins its entitlement
systems based on priority of use. What has changed and led to the
convergence is that water is now viewed as a scarce resource in both
regions that must be utilized fully to meet as many water needs as possible,
wherever located. What has changed is that both East and West have added
certainty to their water rights systems by integrating groundwater and
surface water. What has changed is that both the East and especially the
West, under the rubric of public interest, now insist that the legal
entitlement system also must recognize the ecological needs of the
watersheds themselves and the societal interest in an equitable sharing of
the benefits associated with water use. Looking prospectively, this Article
predicts the next major change will be a convergent approach to water
triage in the ever-more frequent episodes of regional shortage. More
specifically, both East and West will find ways to ensure that their water law
protects concentrated human populations, ecosystems, energy, and food
production against disaster, usually in that order. 117
What has not been explored in greater detail is perhaps the most far-
reaching example of East and West convergence-as the states of the East
move to regulated riparianism, both East and West are moving toward total
abandonment of their common law origins to become administered systems
featuring quantified water rights. The quantification provides the certainty of
right needed to encourage reliance and investment. The administration
works proactively to adjudicate rights before they are brought on-line and
eliminates the waste and uncertainty of having to initiate a water use as a
step in the process of adjudicating its legal viability. Having an
administrative body in place, as well as having broad and enforceable
planning requirements, creates the possibility of management to carry the
community through times of water shortage and economic and ecologic
stress induced by drought or other unforeseen water exigencies.
The transition to ever-more managerial systems, although seldom
noted, has been quite dramatic. Indeed, when Janet Neuman, James
Huffman, and several of the authors in this tribute began their scholarly
careers, the water law of both the East and the West were dominated by the
common law of riparianism and prior appropriation. And while the water
law of the East and the West remain so different at their core, they are very
similar in their objectives and, increasingly, in their conceptual solutions to
many of water law's most important questions.
167 WATER LAWS COMM., supra note 18, at 112, 294-310.
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